The theory of asymmetric information and agent theory
Andraš Šagi, Eva Pataki
Abstract
Andraš Šagi, Eva Pataki
Abstract
The work reviews and analyzes the theory of asymmetric information and agent theory. The first part presents the possibility of bankruptcy or market disturbance because of asymmetric informativeness of market participants. It considers the connectivity of asymmetric information with uncertainty and moral hazard following market transactions in terms of asymmetric informativeness. It also explains the process of counter-selection at the market. The second part presents agent theory and its similarities with the theory of asymmetric information are stated.
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The work reviews and analyzes the theory of asymmetric information and agent theory. The first part presents the possibility of bankruptcy or market disturbance because of asymmetric informativeness of market participants. It considers the connectivity of asymmetric information with uncertainty and moral hazard following market transactions in terms of asymmetric informativeness. It also explains the process of counter-selection at the market. The second part presents agent theory and its similarities with the theory of asymmetric information are stated.
Key concepts: Information asymmetry, Moral hazard, Adverse selection, Bankruptcy, Economics, Microeconomics, Information theory, Complete information