The Razor Argument of Metaphysics A.9
José Edgar González Varela
Abstract
José Edgar González Varela
Abstract
Abstract I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms inMetaphysicsA.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.
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Abstract I discuss Aristotle’s opening argument against Platonic Forms inMetaphysicsA.9, ‘the Razor’, which criticizes the introduction of Forms on the basis of an analogy with a hypothetical case of counting things. I argue for a new interpretation of this argument, and show that it involves two interesting objections against the introduction of Forms as formal causes: one concerns the completeness and the other the adequacy of such an explanatory project.
Key concepts: Metaphysics, Argument (complex analysis), Epistemology, Philosophy, Interpretation (philosophy), Analogy, Ancient philosophy, Completeness (order theory)