Lying, Deception, and Deceit
Andreas Stokke
Abstract
Andreas Stokke
Abstract
This chapter presents the traditional view of lying, according to which to lie is to say something one believes to be false with the intent to deceive. It is argued that this view is too narrow in that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive, and this alternative account of lying is defended against critical attempts to reconcile the deceptive view of lying with so-called bald-faced lying. The chapter ends by laying out the account of lying argued for in the book. According to this view, to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood as saying something and thereby propose that it become part of the common ground of the conversation.
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This chapter presents the traditional view of lying, according to which to lie is to say something one believes to be false with the intent to deceive. It is argued that this view is too narrow in that lying does not necessarily involve intentions to deceive, and this alternative account of lying is defended against critical attempts to reconcile the deceptive view of lying with so-called bald-faced lying. The chapter ends by laying out the account of lying argued for in the book. According to this view, to lie is to assert something one believes to be false, where assertion is understood as saying something and thereby propose that it become part of the common ground of the conversation.
Key concepts: Lying, Deception, Assertion, Lie detection, Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy, Social psychology