Determining the "Gap"

Doctrine is under attack from within the military and by the American press. The length of the current conflict has been "perceived" as too long, and the United States Military, according to some has been to slow to adapt. Accusations of "gaps" within military doctrine have been presented as reasons for the slow adaptation. This monograph explores if whether the mechanisms in doctrine are correct, and whether gaps are present. If there are gaps in U.S. military doctrine are they detrimental to the current fight, and limit adaptation and evolution. Using a Process Tracing Case Study methodology this research explores American Army and Joint Doctrine beginning at the formation of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and follow it through to recent releases of the new FM 3-0, 3-24, and 3-07. The brief synopsis of doctrinal history allows the reader to follow evolutionary changes to military doctrine. It also allows the reader to see how these changes are relevant today. The use of non-military theories such as Complexity Theory, and Organizational Development theory shows not only the uniqueness of military thought, but also the effectiveness of implementation of new ideas. Historical examples that explored in this monograph are General William DePuys implementation of AirLand Battle, and the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. As the author traces historical doctrine development, a baseline for doctrine is established. This baseline is seen through the guiding doctrinal principles that have little change throughout the thirty years of evolution. These principles are what have become known as the Principles of War, or Principles of Operations. With an established baseline, the author then looks at the current fight from the eyes of fellow officers by constructing and conducting a survey, that utilizes the convenience sampling technique. The author creates a survey from the established baseline of the Principles of War and asks officers with deployment experience how they saw their operations within Iraq and Afghanistan in a doctrinal sense. Though the results are generalized, they are limited as a random sampling technique was unviable for conducting this research in a reasonable period. The survey results produce show doctrinal gaps within the U.S. Army on how officers view the role of the military advisor, and how they see their operations in light of doctrine. Through the course of the process trace, the author finds that there are organizational gaps between U.S. Military doctrine and Joint doctrine, but the author shows that this gap is key to allowing the military to adapt. Through use of his survey the author determines two further gaps in U.S. Army doctrine. The first is the role of the military advisor within the current conflict and the second a knowledge gap of doctrine itself. The author then analyses these results concluding that there are currently three gaps within doctrine. In the end, critical for maintaining the gap between Joint and Army doctrine is critical to maintain as it allows for adaptation and evolution of the organization. The gaps within U.S. Army doctrine must be furthered explored, but initial recommendations show that there is a baseline within doctrine for the military advisor by following U.S. Army training doctrine, and by adjusting the curriculum of the officer core in order to close the knowledge gap. The author closes by concluding that doctrine is current, viable, and in the hands of the military professional to be kept current. Young officers must be taught that doctrine serves as the guide and common language within the military and that it can be changed using the mechanisms in place.