Simulation Analysis for Cooperative Behavior of Supply Chain Enterprises Based on Game Theory
Huihui Xing, Jia Mao, Shiyu Yang
Abstract
Huihui Xing, Jia Mao, Shiyu Yang
Abstract
With the rapid development of high technology, the competition between enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition among supply chains. The cooperation between supply chain enterprises has become an important way to reduce the cost of enterprises and shorten the product development cycle. To deal with the problem of profit distribution is the key factor to promote cooperation and development of enterprises. In this paper, firstly make a game analysis of the enterprise cooperation in the supply chain, and establish the evolutionary game model of the profit distribution among supply chain enterprises considering subsidy incentives. According to the game situation and environmental assumptions defined by the model, a simulation model is established. The article analyzes the operation results of the simulation model, and obtain the optimal subsidy coefficient and its influencing factors.
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With the rapid development of high technology, the competition between enterprises has gradually evolved into the competition among supply chains. The cooperation between supply chain enterprises has become an important way to reduce the cost of enterprises and shorten the product development cycle. To deal with the problem of profit distribution is the key factor to promote cooperation and development of enterprises. In this paper, firstly make a game analysis of the enterprise cooperation in the supply chain, and establish the evolutionary game model of the profit distribution among supply chain enterprises considering subsidy incentives. According to the game situation and environmental assumptions defined by the model, a simulation model is established. The article analyzes the operation results of the simulation model, and obtain the optimal subsidy coefficient and its influencing factors.
Key concepts: Supply chain, Profit (economics), Incentive, Industrial organization, Subsidy, Game theory, Competition (biology), Distribution (mathematics)