Significance of organizational flexibility in communist revolutionary warfare doctrine and practice.

This monograph examines primary source writings of leading Communist revolutionary warfare theorists to identify and isolate the essence of organizational flexibility. The objective is to gain an appreciation for the important theoretical and practical functions of this concept. This facilitates our understanding of its dynamic role when applied to insurgencies as an operational category of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). In their historical and politico-military doctrinal writings, Mao Tse-tung, Troung Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap developed organizational flexibility as a means toward achieving revolutionary success. Mao went to great lengths to define flexibility along with initiative and planning as one of his three tenets of guerrilla warfare. Troung Chinh attributed "flexibility of tactics" to the Viet Minh success over the Japanese. Giap regarded "suppleness" (flexibility) as one of the main components of guerrilla warfare along with initiative, rapidity, surprise, and suddenness in attack and retreat. Why did these classic revolutionary warfare thinkers emphasize organizational flexibility in their works? More importantly, would an understanding of its conceptual base benefit the US Army and its ability to prepare more effectively for LIC scenarios today? This study concludes that the US Army can improve its tactical capabilities at the low end of the conflict spectrum by fully understanding the importance of flexibility in Communist revolutionary warfare doctrine. An understanding of flexibility as the conceptual nucleus around which guerrilla tactics revolve can serve to condition minds of military leaders and prepare them to counter the relative successes that Communist revolutionary warfare doctrine has enjoyed in Third World areas of conflict.