A posteriori physicalism and phenomenal concepts: The a priori synthesizable objection

Physicalism and consciousnessThe so-ca led phenomenal concept strategy 3 (Loar, 1990) is a physicalist set of responses to anti-physicalist ar uments that aims at accommodating the subjective chara er of consciousness to a physicalist metaphysical framework.More ecifica ly, the strategy aims at responding to ecific ar uments, namely, the conceivability ar ument and the knowledge ar ument.In rough words, those we l-known ar uments share the same structure in that they depart from epistemic premises about the lack of deducibility of phenomenal truths from physical truths and move to the conclusion that phenomenal truths cannot be reduced to physical truths; hence physicalism must be false. (PHYS) □ (P→ ⌐Q)Let P be the complete physical description of the world, and Q the phenomenal description of the world.The conditional is meant to express that once every minimal physical a ect of the world is settled, the phenomenal a ects of the world are neces a ily settled.The knowledge ar ument formulated by Frank Jackson (1982) begins by asking us to consider the lack of an a priori connection between phenomenal and physical truths.