Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion
Abstract
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According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘ C Rule ’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.
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According to what Williamson labels ‘the C account of assertion’, there is one and only one rule that is constitutive of assertion. This rule, the so-called ‘ C Rule ’, states that one must assert p only if p has property C. This paper argues that the C account of assertion is incompatible with any live proposal for C in the literature.
Key concepts: Assertion, Philosophy of language, Metaphysics, Philosophy of science, Property (philosophy), Epistemology, Philosophy, Computer science