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2018•International Journal of Game TheoryOpen access

Hotelling’s location model with negative network externalities

Hans Peters, Marc Schröder, Dries Vermeulen

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Key concepts: Subgame perfect equilibrium, Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, Nash equilibrium, Subgame, Mathematical economics, Economics, Externality, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium

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