2018•Constructivist FoundationsRequires access

Self-Referential and Enactive Nature of First- and Third-Person Sciences of the Mind

Toma Strle

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Abstract

I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics …

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I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics …

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Available abstract

I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics …

Key concepts: Enactivism, Neurophenomenology, Autopoiesis, Constructivism (international relations), Epistemology, Cognitive science, Psychology, Philosophy

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