2006NSUWorks (Nova Southeastern University)Requires access

Managerial Ownership, Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure

Joung W. Kim, Hyungkee Young Baek, Darlene R. Johnson

Open publisher page 106 citations

Abstract

Corporate governance involves various activities that can reduce agency costs. This study found that managerial ownership levels and other types of governance mechanisms in place affect the level and type of corporate discretionary disclosure. These factors, when combined, suggest a complex and interactive corporate governance structure. This study found, for firms with low levels of managerial ownership, a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the level of discretionary disclosure. In addition, firms with a high percentage of outside directors are more likely to disclose board and management processes information, but no other type of discretionary information. Findings also indicate that firms in industries with frequent merger and acquisition activities and with managerial levels of 5% or higher are more likely to disclose ownership structure and investor relations information.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Corporate governance involves various activities that can reduce agency costs. This study found that managerial ownership levels and other types of governance mechanisms in place affect the level and type of corporate discretionary disclosure. These factors, when combined, suggest a complex and interactive corporate governance structure. This study found, for firms with low levels of managerial ownership, a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the level of discretionary disclosure. In addition, firms with a high percentage of outside directors are more likely to disclose board and management processes information, but no other type of discretionary information. Findings also indicate that firms in industries with frequent merger and acquisition activities and with managerial levels of 5% or higher are more likely to disclose ownership structure and investor relations information.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 106 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Corporate governance involves various activities that can reduce agency costs. This study found that managerial ownership levels and other types of governance mechanisms in place affect the level and type of corporate discretionary disclosure. These factors, when combined, suggest a complex and interactive corporate governance structure. This study found, for firms with low levels of managerial ownership, a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and the level of discretionary disclosure. In addition, firms with a high percentage of outside directors are more likely to disclose board and management processes information, but no other type of discretionary information. Findings also indicate that firms in industries with frequent merger and acquisition activities and with managerial levels of 5% or higher are more likely to disclose ownership structure and investor relations information.

Key concepts: Business, Corporate governance, Accounting, Voluntary disclosure, Turnover, Finance, Economics, Management

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Managerial Ownership, Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure — Research Paper | ScholarLens