The cost of capital does not compensate for stranded-cost risk
A. Lawrence Kolbe, William B. Tye
Abstract
A. Lawrence Kolbe, William B. Tye
Abstract
Electric utilities now face the risk that existing assets, costs, or contract commitments may be {open_quotes}stranded{close_quotes} by increased competition, leaving shareholders rather than customers to bear the costs. Have shareholders already been compensated for this risk? Some argue that shareholders have automatically been compensated for this risk by an allowed rate of return equal to the cost of equity capital determined in efficient capital markets. If so, forcing shareholders to bear stranded costs may seem fair. However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny, because the cost of capital by definition does not include such compensation.
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Electric utilities now face the risk that existing assets, costs, or contract commitments may be {open_quotes}stranded{close_quotes} by increased competition, leaving shareholders rather than customers to bear the costs. Have shareholders already been compensated for this risk? Some argue that shareholders have automatically been compensated for this risk by an allowed rate of return equal to the cost of equity capital determined in efficient capital markets. If so, forcing shareholders to bear stranded costs may seem fair. However, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny, because the cost of capital by definition does not include such compensation.
Key concepts: Shareholder, Cost of capital, Scrutiny, Implicit cost, Economics, Cost of equity, Capital (architecture), Equity (law)