Research on Government Environmental Regulation Strategy in WEEE Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
Yichao Yuan, Shi Kuiran
Abstract
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Yichao Yuan, Shi Kuiran
Abstract
Open-access reader
With the progress of science and technology, a large number of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) not only poses a threat to the environment, but also causes serious waste of resources.It's necessary and practically significant for the governments environmental regulation to construct reverse logistics.This paper employs evolutionary game theory to study interaction of governments and firms and investigates the evolutionary stable strategies for firms using recycled wastes to produce new products.The paper shows that the rewards of government regulation, supervision costs, extraneous income of new products that produced by recycling WEEE, and subsidies of firms from the government for constructing the reverse logistics actively are key factors, which can affect the performance of the evolutionary game between the governments and firms.By controlling these factors, evolutionary stable strategies between firms and governments will close to the direction where firms constructing reverse logistics consciously and the governments reducing the proportion of supervision quickly and effectively.
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With the progress of science and technology, a large number of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) not only poses a threat to the environment, but also causes serious waste of resources.It's necessary and practically significant for the governments environmental regulation to construct reverse logistics.This paper employs evolutionary game theory to study interaction of governments and firms and investigates the evolutionary stable strategies for firms using recycled wastes to produce new products.The paper shows that the rewards of government regulation, supervision costs, extraneous income of new products that produced by recycling WEEE, and subsidies of firms from the government for constructing the reverse logistics actively are key factors, which can affect the performance of the evolutionary game between the governments and firms.By controlling these factors, evolutionary stable strategies between firms and governments will close to the direction where firms constructing reverse logistics consciously and the governments reducing the proportion of supervision quickly and effectively.
Key concepts: Game theory, Government (linguistics), Evolutionarily stable strategy, Evolutionary game theory, Evolutionary theory, Government regulation, Environmental economics, Computer science