Plasticity and Modularity

This chapter discusses the prospects of modular theories of cognitive architecture in light of what is perhaps the strongest objection that has been raised against them: that such theories cannot account for the plasticity that is characteristic of humans&s; and other animals&s; cognition. It argues that while plasticity raises a challenge for the strongest modular theories, it also reveals that much of human cognition involves an interplay between modular systems and non-modular cognitive control: in effect, there can be no plasticity without modularity. The chapter introduces modular theories of cognitive architecture; and discusses several influential evolutionary arguments for and against the claim that evolved cognitive architectures should be expected to be modular. It distinguishes different types of plasticity, and presents the challenge that plasticity raises for modular architectures. The notion of a Carruthers-module is undoubtedly weaker than the notion of a Fodor-module, and, in contrast to the former, it applies to many cognitive processes.