On the dialectical justification of ontology

The paper considers principles and preconceptions of some dialectical theories of ancient and modern philosophy which are used for justification of ontology. The author pays most attention to proving his thesis that in the history of justification of ontology classical modern dialectics prevented the reduction of being to entity. Hence, he seeks to determine historical paradigms and types of dialectical theories of ontological knowledge depending on how the principles of these theories correspond with the understanding of the ontological difference, i.e. the difference between being and entity. In particular, the author argues that Hegel’s classical dialectics partly corresponds with the understanding of the ontological difference, and Marx’s postclassical dialectics do not. The paper contains the criticism of the metaphysical prejudices of Hegel and Marx which is particularly based on the principle of the phenomenological understanding of being, as well as on the author’s principle of the dialectical resolution of the well-known paradox of subjectivity.