Transcendental idealism and the 'Tractatus'

The thesis investigates into the relation between transcendental idealism and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus while paying due attention to recent discussions on this issue. As a result of this investigation, the thesis aims to describe the process in which Wittgenstein came to endorse its version of transcendental idealism. \nIn order to address this question, the thesis will begin by observing the recent dispute between two leading scholars, A. W. Moore and P. Sullivan. In particular, I shall focus on Sullivan’s claim developed in his 1996 paper. According to Sullivan, Wittgenstein presents a species of transcendental idealism in the 5.6s in order to eventually dissociate himself from it. Furthermore, Sullivan argued that the oft neglected proposition 5.634 ‘This is connected to the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori’ should be understood as saying that the Kantian conception of the a priori is to be repudiated as a consequence of Wittgenstein’s refutation of idealism. \nContrary to this, by carefully analysing Wittgenstein’s inquiry in the Notebooks, I shall show that Wittgenstein’s philosophical journey led him to a version of transcendental idealism. The Tractarian version of transcendental idealism, I suggest, can best be understood as one that emerges through working out on the essential insights contained in Schopenhauer’s version.