Complexity of Peace and Security Environment and Nuclear Deterrence Revived
Kwang-Ho Chun
Abstract
Kwang-Ho Chun
Abstract
Nuclear deterrence was the cornerstone of British Defence and Foreign Policy throughout the second half of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. The decision on whether to renew the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear capability and continue as a nuclear power is an imminent one; entwined with this is the issue of the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence theory. Is it a relic of the Cold War and can it be applied in the complex security environment the UK finds itself in today? This Paper analyses the cases for and against nuclear deterrence and the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence theory, using various research materials. It considers whether nuclear deterrence has achieved what its proponents claim; preventing global conflict and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It assesses the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence in the light of evolving and complex international threats. It then considers how the theory can evolve to meet and/or deter those threats. It concludes that nuclear deterrence is not merely a relic of the Cold War. It remains relevant today, not least in preventing full scale conflict between nuclear powers; the numbers of which have grown and are likely to grow further. Although to remain relevant and credible, the theory and the capability must continue to evolve.
A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Nuclear deterrence was the cornerstone of British Defence and Foreign Policy throughout the second half of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. The decision on whether to renew the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear capability and continue as a nuclear power is an imminent one; entwined with this is the issue of the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence theory. Is it a relic of the Cold War and can it be applied in the complex security environment the UK finds itself in today? This Paper analyses the cases for and against nuclear deterrence and the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence theory, using various research materials. It considers whether nuclear deterrence has achieved what its proponents claim; preventing global conflict and the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). It assesses the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence in the light of evolving and complex international threats. It then considers how the theory can evolve to meet and/or deter those threats. It concludes that nuclear deterrence is not merely a relic of the Cold War. It remains relevant today, not least in preventing full scale conflict between nuclear powers; the numbers of which have grown and are likely to grow further. Although to remain relevant and credible, the theory and the capability must continue to evolve.
Key concepts: Deterrence theory, Nuclear ethics, Nuclear weapon, Relevance (law), Cold war, Political science, Nuclear power, Law and economics