The 1970s Origins of Too Big to Fail
George Nurisso, Edward Simpson Prescott
Abstract
George Nurisso, Edward Simpson Prescott
Abstract
In 1972, bank regulators bailed out the $1.2 billion Bank of the Commonwealth partly because they viewed it as “too big to fail.” We describe this bailout and subsequent ones through that of Continental Illinois in 1984 and use the descriptions to draw lessons about too-big-to-fail policy. We argue that some of the same issues that motivated bailouts during this earlier period, particularly worries about banking concentration, are relevant today.
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In 1972, bank regulators bailed out the $1.2 billion Bank of the Commonwealth partly because they viewed it as “too big to fail.” We describe this bailout and subsequent ones through that of Continental Illinois in 1984 and use the descriptions to draw lessons about too-big-to-fail policy. We argue that some of the same issues that motivated bailouts during this earlier period, particularly worries about banking concentration, are relevant today.
Key concepts: Bailout, Too big to fail, Commonwealth, Period (music), Financial system, Business, Economics, Keynesian economics