2017•SSRN Electronic JournalOpen access

Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information: Dispensing with Public Randomization

Paulo Barelli, John Duggan

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Key concepts: Subgame perfect equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Perfect information, Randomization, Sequential equilibrium, Computer science, Economics, Microeconomics

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Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Games with Almost Perfect Information: Dispensing with Public Randomization — Research Paper | ScholarLens