Operational Art in Theory and War: A Comparison of Soviet Theory and the Red Army's Conduct in Operation BAGRATION 1944

Abstract : The Soviet theories of Operational Art, developed in the 1920s and 30s, provided a solid theoretical foundation for the Red Army with regards of organization, training, and concept of fighting. Stalin's purges in 1937 stalled the development and left the Red Army ill prepared to meet the German attack in 1941. After two years of strategic defense, the Soviets turned to a strategic offensive, aiming at the decisive defeat of Germany. The large summer offensive in 1944 was the largest and most decisive operation in the war. Operation BAGRATION was the centerpiece of five large interlinked operations with clear strategic objectives. A comparison of this operation with the theory of operational art from the 20s and 30s shows correlations. First, in the strategic imperative. Second, the design of the large summer offensive and Operation BAGRATION particularly resembles the core design of the Operational Art. Third, the role and use of mechanized and tank units in combined arms operations achieved what the theory promised. Fourth, the 1936 Field Regulation's (the institutionalizing of operational art) key features are clearly recognized in the operation. Fifth, the importance of quality commanders at the operational level was highlighted in theory and proved crucial in practical application. This provides a greater understanding of operational art and demonstrates the importance of theory for success in war.