2015Unpublished venueRequires access

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)

David Schultz, John R. Vile

Open publisher page 10 citations

Abstract

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 in 1942, carved out the "fighting words" exception to First Amendment free speech rights. A Jehovah&s;s Witness was distributing some of his sect&s;s religious literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, when citizens complained to the city marshal that Chaplinsky was denouncing other religions as a "racket." The marshal initially told the complainants that Chaplinsky had the right to distribute his literature; he then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd "was getting restless." Antipornography crusaders justify the suppression of material they deem obscene on the grounds that materials do not convey ideas and are thus not entitled to First Amendment protection. Civil libertarians respond that it is precisely because an offensive idea is being transmitted that suppression is desired, and that it subverts the First Amendment to allow government to decide whether an utterance qualifies as an idea.

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What this paper is about

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 in 1942, carved out the "fighting words" exception to First Amendment free speech rights. A Jehovah&s;s Witness was distributing some of his sect&s;s religious literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, when citizens complained to the city marshal that Chaplinsky was denouncing other religions as a "racket." The marshal initially told the complainants that Chaplinsky had the right to distribute his literature; he then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd "was getting restless." Antipornography crusaders justify the suppression of material they deem obscene on the grounds that materials do not convey ideas and are thus not entitled to First Amendment protection. Civil libertarians respond that it is precisely because an offensive idea is being transmitted that suppression is desired, and that it subverts the First Amendment to allow government to decide whether an utterance qualifies as an idea.

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Available abstract

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 in 1942, carved out the "fighting words" exception to First Amendment free speech rights. A Jehovah&s;s Witness was distributing some of his sect&s;s religious literature on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire, when citizens complained to the city marshal that Chaplinsky was denouncing other religions as a "racket." The marshal initially told the complainants that Chaplinsky had the right to distribute his literature; he then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd "was getting restless." Antipornography crusaders justify the suppression of material they deem obscene on the grounds that materials do not convey ideas and are thus not entitled to First Amendment protection. Civil libertarians respond that it is precisely because an offensive idea is being transmitted that suppression is desired, and that it subverts the First Amendment to allow government to decide whether an utterance qualifies as an idea.

Key concepts: History, Geography

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