No abuse is an island: the case of margin squeeze
Annalies Azzopardi
Abstract
Annalies Azzopardi
Abstract
In EU competition practice, margin squeeze is considered a stand-alone type of abuse, meaning that there is no need to consider whether the retail price charged by the dominant undertaking is predatory or whether the wholesale price is excessive, or even whether the dominant undertaking has a duty to deal, for there to be abusive margin squeeze. This article considers the origins of this doctrine and assesses whether the margin squeeze test adopted in EU competition law is sufficient or whether it should be informed by the tests used for other types of abuse. The conclusion reached is that reference to tests used for related types of abuses would be beneficial.
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In EU competition practice, margin squeeze is considered a stand-alone type of abuse, meaning that there is no need to consider whether the retail price charged by the dominant undertaking is predatory or whether the wholesale price is excessive, or even whether the dominant undertaking has a duty to deal, for there to be abusive margin squeeze. This article considers the origins of this doctrine and assesses whether the margin squeeze test adopted in EU competition law is sufficient or whether it should be informed by the tests used for other types of abuse. The conclusion reached is that reference to tests used for related types of abuses would be beneficial.
Key concepts: Margin (machine learning), Predatory pricing, Competition law, Duty, Meaning (existential), Competition (biology), Doctrine, Economics