A New Generation of Warfare: The Attempt to Eliminate Clausewitz in American Military Theory

All U.S. military schools religiously study Carl von Clausewitz and his theory of war. What is significant is that in refining Clausewitzian theory over the last century we have not come far from his basic tenets. If anything, we have done much to institutionalize his theories of war even further. The elements of Objective, Unity of Command, Surprise, Economy of Force, Simplicity, the Trinity of War, Uncertainty, Friction, Fog, the relationship between military force and policy, and the basic purpose of war have been drilled into the minds of military professionals from their very first exposure to the military arts. Other nonwestern military theorists have been taught in U.S. military institutions (e.g., Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, General Giap), but only when they fit inside a pro-Clausewitzian framework of a western style of warfare. By eliminating Clausewitzian theory in the way we view warfighting, we may be better able to bridge the gap between thinking in the past and confronting the next revolution in military thought. One need not look far into the past to see that war has not always been the continuation of policy by another means for all participants, nor is there any certainty that the trend will continue. In our effort to understand how the nature and conduct of war will be waged in the future, the answer may lie with the need to repudiate Clausewitz by answering two elemental questions: what is war, and why will wars be fought in the future?