2010•Unpublished venueRequires access

The Coordination Problem

Lesley Van Schoubroeck

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Abstract

Governments can depend upon the formal structures of the public sector to produce coordination even less than in the past, but the incentives of individuals have at the same time become less collective and more personal. At the very time that an efficient, effective and well-coordinated government is perhaps most needed it is ever more a quest rather than a reality.

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What this paper is about

Governments can depend upon the formal structures of the public sector to produce coordination even less than in the past, but the incentives of individuals have at the same time become less collective and more personal. At the very time that an efficient, effective and well-coordinated government is perhaps most needed it is ever more a quest rather than a reality.

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Available abstract

Governments can depend upon the formal structures of the public sector to produce coordination even less than in the past, but the incentives of individuals have at the same time become less collective and more personal. At the very time that an efficient, effective and well-coordinated government is perhaps most needed it is ever more a quest rather than a reality.

Key concepts: Incentive, Government (linguistics), Law and economics, Public sector, Business, Public relations, Economics, Political science

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