2017•Mathematical Social SciencesRequires access

Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts

Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela

Open publisher page 4 citations

Abstract

This record does not include an abstract. Use the full-text link above if available.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

An abstract is not available in the OpenAlex record for this paper.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 4 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Key concepts: English auction, Common value auction, Generalized second-price auction, Vickrey auction, Bid shading, Revenue equivalence, Unique bid auction, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction

Back to paper search Browse research topics Original source

Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts — Research Paper | ScholarLens