2011Cambridge University Press eBooksRequires access

SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW

Allan R. Brewer–Carías

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution In all democratic countries, constitutional courts have the same role of interpreting and applying the Constitution to preserve its supremacy by testing the constitutionality or conventionality of statutes, and to ensure the prevalence of the democratic principle and of fundamental rights, they even have the role of adapting the Constitution when societal changes and time impose such a task. This is true in all systems of constitutional judicial review, where a progressive convergence of principles and solutions has consolidated over the past decades. Today it is difficult even to draw clearly the classic distinction between the concentrated and the diffuse systems of judicial review, which were so commonly used during many decades. In all the systems, the basic principle that can be identified is that constitutional courts, in accomplishing their roles, must always be subordinated to the Constitution, not allowed to invade the field of the Legislator or of the constituent power. The contrary would be, as asserted by Sandra Morelli in the Colombia National Report, to develop an “irresponsible judicial totalitarianism,” which of course is part of the pathology of judicial review. That is, constitutional courts can assist the legislators in accomplishing their functions, but they cannot substitute for the Legislators and enact legislation – nor do they have any discretionary political basis for creating legal norms or provisions that cannot be deducted from the Constitution itself.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution In all democratic countries, constitutional courts have the same role of interpreting and applying the Constitution to preserve its supremacy by testing the constitutionality or conventionality of statutes, and to ensure the prevalence of the democratic principle and of fundamental rights, they even have the role of adapting the Constitution when societal changes and time impose such a task. This is true in all systems of constitutional judicial review, where a progressive convergence of principles and solutions has consolidated over the past decades. Today it is difficult even to draw clearly the classic distinction between the concentrated and the diffuse systems of judicial review, which were so commonly used during many decades. In all the systems, the basic principle that can be identified is that constitutional courts, in accomplishing their roles, must always be subordinated to the Constitution, not allowed to invade the field of the Legislator or of the constituent power. The contrary would be, as asserted by Sandra Morelli in the Colombia National Report, to develop an “irresponsible judicial totalitarianism,” which of course is part of the pathology of judicial review. That is, constitutional courts can assist the legislators in accomplishing their functions, but they cannot substitute for the Legislators and enact legislation – nor do they have any discretionary political basis for creating legal norms or provisions that cannot be deducted from the Constitution itself.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution In all democratic countries, constitutional courts have the same role of interpreting and applying the Constitution to preserve its supremacy by testing the constitutionality or conventionality of statutes, and to ensure the prevalence of the democratic principle and of fundamental rights, they even have the role of adapting the Constitution when societal changes and time impose such a task. This is true in all systems of constitutional judicial review, where a progressive convergence of principles and solutions has consolidated over the past decades. Today it is difficult even to draw clearly the classic distinction between the concentrated and the diffuse systems of judicial review, which were so commonly used during many decades. In all the systems, the basic principle that can be identified is that constitutional courts, in accomplishing their roles, must always be subordinated to the Constitution, not allowed to invade the field of the Legislator or of the constituent power. The contrary would be, as asserted by Sandra Morelli in the Colombia National Report, to develop an “irresponsible judicial totalitarianism,” which of course is part of the pathology of judicial review. That is, constitutional courts can assist the legislators in accomplishing their functions, but they cannot substitute for the Legislators and enact legislation – nor do they have any discretionary political basis for creating legal norms or provisions that cannot be deducted from the Constitution itself.

Key concepts: Constitutionality, Constitution, Statute, Political science, Law, Democracy, Constitutional review, Constitutional law

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
SYNTHESIS REPORT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW — Research Paper | ScholarLens