Ten Myths of “Say on Pay”
David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall, Gaizka Ormazábal, Brian Tayan
Abstract
David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall, Gaizka Ormazábal, Brian Tayan
Abstract
The public believes that “say on pay” reduces executive compensation and leads to improved compensation practices. The research evidence, however, shows this is not the case. Is it time to rethink say on pay? The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important.
OpenAlex reports 10 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
The public believes that “say on pay” reduces executive compensation and leads to improved compensation practices. The research evidence, however, shows this is not the case. Is it time to rethink say on pay? The Closer Look series is a collection of short case studies through which we explore topics, issues, and controversies in corporate governance. In each study, we take a targeted look at a specific issue that is relevant to the current debate on governance and explain why it is so important.
Key concepts: Executive compensation, Shareholder, Corporate governance, Accounting, Compensation (psychology), Business, Equity (law), Context (archaeology)