The Identity of the Object: Quine's Interpretation of Hume

We show how Quine inherits from Hume some aspects of his conception of the physical object : both philosophers, examining the extent to which our concepts are empirically guaranteed, hold that the object’s identity is not sufficiently determined by experience. In Quine, this thesis is grounded in the indeterminacy of reference, in Hume, in an analysis of identity as a fiction of the imagination. Determining thus his own place in a subjective history of empiricism, Quine sees this analysis as a confused perception of the fact that identity appears in the conceptual system only when divided reference is acquired. We show how both philosophers then face the tension between the empiricist demand of a construction of concepts from the empirical data, and the denial of any complete determination. We thus show how Quine’s rejection of the reductionism dogma finds one of its roots in Hume’s Treatise.