Battle Command: Vision for Success

The information Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) promises much, but will it deliver? The author observes that information technology and precision weaponry will not necessarily guarantee success on future battlefields. He contends that leaders wielding a, firm understanding of command principles-leaders with ability to see and understand battlefield events before they happen-will be key to future success. He cautions that overreliance on decision, rather than vision that guides decision, can lead to failure. His proposed definitions make essential distinctions between command and command, offering logical methods for commanders to employ in command process to take full advantage of technology information RMA has to offer. BELIEVERS IN information revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) are promising much to US Army: success in war with outnumbered forces, low casualties and a lower defense budget. But information RMA will be unable to deliver on these promises. While information technology will allow rapid movement and better management of data on and off battlefield, it ignores how information will be used. That issue is at heart of winning wars. The assumption implied in RMA promises is that given quality data, individuals will make correct decisions. Yet, history provides numerous examples of commanders making poor decisions or refusing to change poor decisions in light of quality data. I believe our Army is focused on decision itself rather than on vision that gives decision value. Further, this focus is embedded in our command definition. But is this definition correct, and is our current understanding of command creating chaos in our Army? Challenging Current Concepts The 1993 version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, formally introduced idea of command.l Battle command is defined as the art of decision making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions. [It] includes visualizing current state and future state, then formulating concepts of operations to get from one to other at least cost. Battle command also includes assigning missions; prioritizing and allocating resources; selecting critical time and place to act; and knowing how and when to make adjustments during fight.2 Does this definition provide insight to command or confuse practitioner? In my opinion, this definition has several flaws. The most critical is its absence of vision. To decide, one must be able to see and understand battlefield events before they happen. The need to see is critical task. Once everything on battlefield is understood, decisions are easy. The FM definition, however, highlights decision's importance, not vision that creates need for it. The problem with this definition is that it is identical to definition of command-Command is art of decision making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action to accomplish missions at least cost to soldiers.3 Why are there two terms to describe same concept or collection of skills? This alone can cause confusion to anyone trying to apply terms. Additionally, what is meant by battle decision making? Does this imply that command is practiced only on battlefield during execution of plan and ignored at other times? If command includes vision, how can it be limited to time of actual contact? What are other types of decisions? Finally, what is leadership's role in command? Must a commander be charismatic to be a successful commander? Is motivation a subset of leadership? These issues indicate that there is a definite problem with our understanding, definition and application of command. The effect of these problems is obvious when one tries to integrate command with other combat functions. …