2001Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)Requires access

Defending the Defender Keeping the Shield Strong

Michael Pasquarett, Patrick Carney, Cohen, Peter, Richard Dillon

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Abstract

If or more likely when the United States begins to construct and field a viable missile defense system those who oppose this country's aims will most likely also begin to craft a response. What types of responses will they chose? We can be sure they will take measures intended to overcome or at least reduce the effectiveness of any type of missile defense system the United States decides to employ. While there has been extensive discussion of possible offensive missile countermeasures (decoys warhead shielding quantitative overmatch etc.) there appears to have been less consideration given to the possibility that an opponent might choose some method of direct attack on the infrastructure of the missile defense system itself. However some adversaries already may be focusing on asymmetric methods to attack United States missile defense capabilities rather than engage in a major offensive missile buildup necessary to directly challenge an American missile defense system. If this is true how do we protect our missile defense system from such attack particularly from non-missile attacks? A recently conducted workshop at the U. S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership examined this issue. Over thirty-five subject matter experts from both the federal government and the private sector participated in the three-day workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College's Collins Center from 26-28 November 2001. The purpose of the workshop was to explore issues regarding the security of our present and future space and missile defense system's especially from asymmetric threats. Workshop participants examined the vulnerabilities of the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) portions of the Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) system based on projected operational concepts briefed during the workshop.

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What this paper is about

If or more likely when the United States begins to construct and field a viable missile defense system those who oppose this country's aims will most likely also begin to craft a response. What types of responses will they chose? We can be sure they will take measures intended to overcome or at least reduce the effectiveness of any type of missile defense system the United States decides to employ. While there has been extensive discussion of possible offensive missile countermeasures (decoys warhead shielding quantitative overmatch etc.) there appears to have been less consideration given to the possibility that an opponent might choose some method of direct attack on the infrastructure of the missile defense system itself. However some adversaries already may be focusing on asymmetric methods to attack United States missile defense capabilities rather than engage in a major offensive missile buildup necessary to directly challenge an American missile defense system. If this is true how do we protect our missile defense system from such attack particularly from non-missile attacks? A recently conducted workshop at the U. S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership examined this issue. Over thirty-five subject matter experts from both the federal government and the private sector participated in the three-day workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College's Collins Center from 26-28 November 2001. The purpose of the workshop was to explore issues regarding the security of our present and future space and missile defense system's especially from asymmetric threats. Workshop participants examined the vulnerabilities of the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) portions of the Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) system based on projected operational concepts briefed during the workshop.

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Available abstract

If or more likely when the United States begins to construct and field a viable missile defense system those who oppose this country's aims will most likely also begin to craft a response. What types of responses will they chose? We can be sure they will take measures intended to overcome or at least reduce the effectiveness of any type of missile defense system the United States decides to employ. While there has been extensive discussion of possible offensive missile countermeasures (decoys warhead shielding quantitative overmatch etc.) there appears to have been less consideration given to the possibility that an opponent might choose some method of direct attack on the infrastructure of the missile defense system itself. However some adversaries already may be focusing on asymmetric methods to attack United States missile defense capabilities rather than engage in a major offensive missile buildup necessary to directly challenge an American missile defense system. If this is true how do we protect our missile defense system from such attack particularly from non-missile attacks? A recently conducted workshop at the U. S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership examined this issue. Over thirty-five subject matter experts from both the federal government and the private sector participated in the three-day workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College's Collins Center from 26-28 November 2001. The purpose of the workshop was to explore issues regarding the security of our present and future space and missile defense system's especially from asymmetric threats. Workshop participants examined the vulnerabilities of the National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) portions of the Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) system based on projected operational concepts briefed during the workshop.

Key concepts: Missile defense, Offensive, Adversary, Missile, Strategic Defense Initiative, Computer security, Government (linguistics), Engineering

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