One Merger, Two Agencies: Dual Review in the Breakdown of the AT&T / T-Mobile Merger and a Proposal for Reform
Laura Kaplan
Abstract
Laura Kaplan
Abstract
Mergers in the telecommunications industry are unique because they are reviewed by not one, but two federal agencies. Mergers in most industries are subject only to antitrust review by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Telecommunications mergers, however, are also subject to review by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under its flexible public interest standard. This system of dual review causes delay, redundancy, and a perversion of antitrust and telecommunications law. This note examines the system of dual review through the lens of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, proposed and eventually abandoned in 2011. After outlining the historical development and statutory authority for dual review, the note demonstrates how dual review altered the DOJ's typical burden structure in an attempt to block the AT&T/T-Mobile merger. Finally, the note presents a proposal for reform, arguing that significantly limiting the scope of the FCC's review and holding this review to a strict time limit is the best solution.
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Mergers in the telecommunications industry are unique because they are reviewed by not one, but two federal agencies. Mergers in most industries are subject only to antitrust review by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Telecommunications mergers, however, are also subject to review by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under its flexible public interest standard. This system of dual review causes delay, redundancy, and a perversion of antitrust and telecommunications law. This note examines the system of dual review through the lens of the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, proposed and eventually abandoned in 2011. After outlining the historical development and statutory authority for dual review, the note demonstrates how dual review altered the DOJ's typical burden structure in an attempt to block the AT&T/T-Mobile merger. Finally, the note presents a proposal for reform, arguing that significantly limiting the scope of the FCC's review and holding this review to a strict time limit is the best solution.
Key concepts: Commission, Statutory law, Scope (computer science), Limiting, Economic Justice, Law and economics, Dual (grammatical number), Subject (documents)