2005Unpublished venueRequires access

Law as an Autonomous Discipline

Brian H. Bix

Open publisher page 14 citations

Abstract

This article considers claims about the ‘autonomy of law’. These are that that legal reasoning is different from other forms of reasoning; that legal decision-making is different from other forms of decision-making; that legal reasoning and decision-making are sufficient to themselves, that they neither need help from other approaches nor would they be significantly improved by such help; and that legal scholarship should be about distinctively legal topics (often referred to as ‘legal doctrine’) and is not or should not be about other topics.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

This article considers claims about the ‘autonomy of law’. These are that that legal reasoning is different from other forms of reasoning; that legal decision-making is different from other forms of decision-making; that legal reasoning and decision-making are sufficient to themselves, that they neither need help from other approaches nor would they be significantly improved by such help; and that legal scholarship should be about distinctively legal topics (often referred to as ‘legal doctrine’) and is not or should not be about other topics.

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OpenAlex reports 14 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This article considers claims about the ‘autonomy of law’. These are that that legal reasoning is different from other forms of reasoning; that legal decision-making is different from other forms of decision-making; that legal reasoning and decision-making are sufficient to themselves, that they neither need help from other approaches nor would they be significantly improved by such help; and that legal scholarship should be about distinctively legal topics (often referred to as ‘legal doctrine’) and is not or should not be about other topics.

Key concepts: Legal doctrine, Autonomy, Empirical legal studies, Legal realism, Doctrine, Legal opinion, Scholarship, Political science

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