U.S. interests in Central Asia : policy priorities and military roles

The current U.S. military presence in Central Asia is something of an historical accident. The question is whether or not it is also an anomaly. For the first ten years after Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan became independent, sovereign states, the United States saw its interests in the region as limited. What engagement there was demanded little from the U.S. military, and there seemed to be no particular reason that this should change in the future. The region was remote, landlocked, and of little strategic consequence. Although Central Asia's energy resources and proximity to Russia, Iran, and China required some U.S. attention, and the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure remaining after the Soviet Union's breakup made for an even more compelling concern, the region was far from critical to the United States. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) called on U.S. forces to deploy to and fight in a part of the world where few planners had ever envisioned sending them. Central Asia suddenly became valuable real estate to the United States as it decided how to deploy and maintain forces for that operation. In fall 2001, U.S. forces deployed to Central Asia and set up bases and operations. At the same time, the U.S. government stepped up its cooperation programs with the host countries. This document argues that although the United States has significant interests in Central Asia and must maintain relationships with the states of the region, the military component of this effort, while essential, is comparatively small. Operation Enduring Freedom creates real requirements, but these will end when that operation does (or as it draws down). Even if the military role is small, however, the evolution of U.S. security policy toward Central Asia will be a critical component of the U.S. national security strategy for reasons beyond OEF itself.