2012Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)Requires access

Biocruise: A Contemporary Threat

Michael E. Dickey

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Abstract

The specter of intermediate-range and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction has troubled the international community for some time. The prospect of an "irrational actor," state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future U.S. and international community involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or nonstate actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints that may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have a significant impact on U.S. decision makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations. Appendix A presents a table of past and present biological weapon programs by country. The table includes program status, possible bioagents involved, and whether the country is a sponsor of terrorism. Appendix B is a table of cruise missiles possessed by selected nations that includes type, launch method, range, payload, and status.

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The specter of intermediate-range and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction has troubled the international community for some time. The prospect of an "irrational actor," state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future U.S. and international community involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or nonstate actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints that may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have a significant impact on U.S. decision makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations. Appendix A presents a table of past and present biological weapon programs by country. The table includes program status, possible bioagents involved, and whether the country is a sponsor of terrorism. Appendix B is a table of cruise missiles possessed by selected nations that includes type, launch method, range, payload, and status.

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Available abstract

The specter of intermediate-range and short-range missile proliferation and their employment by rogue regimes to deliver weapons of mass destruction has troubled the international community for some time. The prospect of an "irrational actor," state or non-state, in possession of such a missile, coupled with current proliferation in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons opens up frightening scenarios for future U.S. and international community involvement in regional conflicts. Recent innovations in cruise missile technology pose a new and potentially greater problem than that posed by ballistic missiles. Cruise missiles are far easier to obtain, maintain, weaponize, and employ than ballistic missiles. Given the greater ease of production of biological weapons compared to nuclear or chemical weapons, and the ease of acquisition of a cruise missile delivery system compared to ballistic missiles, several operational scenarios may prove inviting to states or nonstate actors intent on influencing the United States or attacking its forces. This paper reviews proliferation and ease of weaponization of biological agents, as well as the extent of proliferation of cruise missiles, along with their general capabilities. Finally, it reviews constraints that may be inhibiting the use of biological weapons, and poses plausible employment scenarios that could have a significant impact on U.S. decision makers as well as on USAF Air Expeditionary Forces. This paper seeks to raise the level of awareness of a threat, which is not "emerging" as much as it is already a clear and present danger to the United States and USAF expeditionary operations. Appendix A presents a table of past and present biological weapon programs by country. The table includes program status, possible bioagents involved, and whether the country is a sponsor of terrorism. Appendix B is a table of cruise missiles possessed by selected nations that includes type, launch method, range, payload, and status.

Key concepts: Cruise missile, Ballistic missile, Nuclear weapon, Aeronautics, Missile, Engineering, Biological warfare, State (computer science)

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