Operational Intelligence and Operational Design: Thinking about Operational Art

Abstract : Uncertainty is an inescapable part of war that stems, in part, from wars wicked problems and the complex, adaptive systems that produce them. While uncertainty in war is chronic, both operational intelligence and Operational Design endeavor to mitigate it on behalf of the commander. Operational intelligence strives to make sense of past and current circumstances to inform future action; Operational Design endeavors to shape the future based on what is learned from the past and known or suspected about the present. Operational intelligence collects and analyzes information to build understanding of a complex situation; Operational Design translates understanding into an approach for achieving operational aims and strategic outcomes. Without uncertainty in war, there would be no need for operational intelligence or Operational Design; because of uncertainty, they become two sides of the same coin. This project is about intelligence at the operational level of war. It is also about Operational Design and the 1948-1960 anti-communist counterinsurgency known as the Malayan Emergency. Using a dialectic approach, the project evaluates how operational intelligence should be influenced by emerging concepts of Operational Design. It first analyzes the essence and practice of operational intelligence, considers its relationship with the operational-level commander, and assesses its role in the Malayan Emergency. It then analyzes Operational Design, including a Design-based reassessment of the Malayan Emergency. Finally, it synthesizes studies of operational intelligence and Operational Design to produce insights and suggestions for commanders and their intelligence professionals on performing, educating, training, and equipping operational intelligence. The project concludes that operational intelligence is more than tactical reconnaissance writ large. It suggests ways to balance operational intelligence's inherent tensions.