Naval Projection Forces: The Case for a Responsive MAF.
Desmond P. Wilson
Abstract
Desmond P. Wilson
Abstract
The contingency of a short-warning, conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most severe defense problems facing the United States and its allies. While the United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the rate at which U.S. based reinforcements can be employed. Because reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long, Defense planners continue to look to additional airlift, rather than to sea lift, to help offset NATO's early deficit in forces. However, it is possible to improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One such possibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier, rather than later, in a NATO contingency. The responsive MAF concept: Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces; Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the amphibious force; Offers savings in added prepositioned equipment and airlift procurement to reduce the current deficit in early reinforcements for NATO; Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusive reliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within the first 30 days; and Reduces the Navy's presence in the Pacific.
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The contingency of a short-warning, conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most severe defense problems facing the United States and its allies. While the United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the rate at which U.S. based reinforcements can be employed. Because reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long, Defense planners continue to look to additional airlift, rather than to sea lift, to help offset NATO's early deficit in forces. However, it is possible to improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One such possibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier, rather than later, in a NATO contingency. The responsive MAF concept: Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces; Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the amphibious force; Offers savings in added prepositioned equipment and airlift procurement to reduce the current deficit in early reinforcements for NATO; Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusive reliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within the first 30 days; and Reduces the Navy's presence in the Pacific.
Key concepts: Procurement, Aeronautics, Navy, Engineering, Airlift, Operations research, Lift (data mining), Flexibility (engineering)