1978Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)Requires access

Naval Projection Forces: The Case for a Responsive MAF.

Desmond P. Wilson

Open publisher page 6 citations

Abstract

The contingency of a short-warning, conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most severe defense problems facing the United States and its allies. While the United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the rate at which U.S. based reinforcements can be employed. Because reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long, Defense planners continue to look to additional airlift, rather than to sea lift, to help offset NATO's early deficit in forces. However, it is possible to improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One such possibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier, rather than later, in a NATO contingency. The responsive MAF concept: Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces; Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the amphibious force; Offers savings in added prepositioned equipment and airlift procurement to reduce the current deficit in early reinforcements for NATO; Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusive reliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within the first 30 days; and Reduces the Navy's presence in the Pacific.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

The contingency of a short-warning, conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most severe defense problems facing the United States and its allies. While the United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the rate at which U.S. based reinforcements can be employed. Because reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long, Defense planners continue to look to additional airlift, rather than to sea lift, to help offset NATO's early deficit in forces. However, it is possible to improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One such possibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier, rather than later, in a NATO contingency. The responsive MAF concept: Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces; Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the amphibious force; Offers savings in added prepositioned equipment and airlift procurement to reduce the current deficit in early reinforcements for NATO; Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusive reliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within the first 30 days; and Reduces the Navy's presence in the Pacific.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 6 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

The contingency of a short-warning, conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact against Central Europe poses one of the most severe defense problems facing the United States and its allies. While the United States has taken initiatives to improve its forces already in Europe, little progress has been made in improving the rate at which U.S. based reinforcements can be employed. Because reinforcement by sea is thought to take so long, Defense planners continue to look to additional airlift, rather than to sea lift, to help offset NATO's early deficit in forces. However, it is possible to improve the responsiveness of forces coming by sea. One such possibility is to employ the amphibious force earlier, rather than later, in a NATO contingency. The responsive MAF concept: Improves arrival times in Europe by at least 20 days over the current mode of operating amphibious forces; Is an equal-cost alternative for employing the amphibious force; Offers savings in added prepositioned equipment and airlift procurement to reduce the current deficit in early reinforcements for NATO; Diversifies and adds flexibility to the exclusive reliance on airlift for reinforcing NATO within the first 30 days; and Reduces the Navy's presence in the Pacific.

Key concepts: Procurement, Aeronautics, Navy, Engineering, Airlift, Operations research, Lift (data mining), Flexibility (engineering)

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Naval Projection Forces: The Case for a Responsive MAF. — Research Paper | ScholarLens