Peter Dietsch's Catching capital: the ethics of tax competition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 280 pp.

This excellent book explores normative issues related to tax competition among states and proposes solutions to core problems identified.The two main questions which the book tackles are: What, if anything, is wrong with tax competition?And, if there is something ethically problematic, what should be done?Dietsch argues that "tax evasion and the shifting of profits to low-tax jurisdictions represent egregious forms of free-riding on the part of capital owners and one of the most blatant injustices of modern economic societies.We need to get a grip on them" (p.223).As far as I am aware, this is the only book-length normative assessment of tax competition available and, as such, it makes a highly original contribution to important literatures.This work, principally in economic philosophy, blends issues and insights from at least four different disciplines, namely political philosophy, economics, political sciences, and international tax law.It is accessibly written and aims to reach a broad audience including philosophers, economists, political scientists, law theorists, along with policymakers and members of international organizations.It is centrally focused on the normative underpinnings of how the international tax regime should be organized.But it also offers concrete proposals about how to create institutions and policies that would best match the theoretical analysis and bring its core normative insights into being.Dietsch argues that enormous private wealth is hidden in tax havens and restoring fiscal control to states will require more effectively catching this capital, so that those who have a right to tax capital are able to do this effectively.We have to reform the international fiscal policy regimes so that effective taxation is possible.These goals require answering a number of core questions.If some coordination in tax policy is required to respond to tax competition, what will be the implications for states' fiscal sovereignty?Can one regulate tax competition without calling for an