Dreaming of normalisation. Germany vs. Russia. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 225 | 04.11.2016
Artur Ciechanowicz, Kamil Frymark
Abstract
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Artur Ciechanowicz, Kamil Frymark
Abstract
Open-access reader
Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its propaganda actions targeting Germany have resulted in an increase in German society’s distrust of Russia and to more assertive political reactions. They have also translated into unprecedented, increased support for eastern allies within NATO. Posing as an architect of the peace process in Ukraine, Germany has indirectly become a hostage to the success of this process (or the lack of it). However, the involvement of both Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in working out and implementing the Minsk agreement has not brought the results Berlin had expected. This has amplified Germany’s disappointment with both Russia and Ukraine. However, withdrawing from this involvement would scarcely be imaginable due to the significant political capital invested in these actions so far. Hence the attempts to save face and the efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreement, as well as the temptation to devise its subsequent variants (which would be increasingly less favourable for Ukraine).
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Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine and its propaganda actions targeting Germany have resulted in an increase in German society’s distrust of Russia and to more assertive political reactions. They have also translated into unprecedented, increased support for eastern allies within NATO. Posing as an architect of the peace process in Ukraine, Germany has indirectly become a hostage to the success of this process (or the lack of it). However, the involvement of both Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in working out and implementing the Minsk agreement has not brought the results Berlin had expected. This has amplified Germany’s disappointment with both Russia and Ukraine. However, withdrawing from this involvement would scarcely be imaginable due to the significant political capital invested in these actions so far. Hence the attempts to save face and the efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreement, as well as the temptation to devise its subsequent variants (which would be increasingly less favourable for Ukraine).
Key concepts: Distrust, Disappointment, Temptation, German, Politics, Political science, Economic history, Aggression