Dealing with NATO's Security Challenges -Where the East Merges with the South

It is probably safe to say that North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is at a crossroads once again. When dissolution of Warsaw Pact and then Soviet Union itself removed immediate threat to members of Western alliance, NATO struggled to find its new raison d'etre. Times have changed since then, borders are being re-drawn by force in Europe again, and diplomats of a large European country openly promise use of nuclear weapons against a small nation which decided to improve its naval radar capabilities and fulfil its obligations to Alliance.1 But now, with threatening statements being heard once again from Central Russian Plain, there are doubts being articulated by some NATO members on need to restore Alliance's defence capabilities to state that existed in period when rhetoric from Moscow was far less aggressive.Some southern NATO Allies, who do not feel directly threatened by Russia, would prefer NATO to concentrate on non-military crises originating in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as well as their implications for Allies' internal security and stability of their socio-economic situation-arguing that threat from Russia is over-exaggerated by Eastern Europeans. These southern NATO members agree in principle that security concerns of their eastern should be dealt with, but are concerned that East means less South and that investments in defence of Alliance's eastern flank of will consume limited resources and waste them on tackling a non-existent challenge. The southern NATO countries are therefore reluctant to support strategic adaptation of Alliance to conventional state to state warfare and need to improve NATO's capability to deter challenges against its members' interests. They also argue that efforts to reassure new NATO members with a temporary or permanent presence on eastern flank will only provoke Moscow further, suggesting that preserving current status quo better fits overall security needs of Alliance and stating that diplomacy is proper substitute for military power and resolute efforts to repel challengers.It would be very short-sighted, though, to assume that what is happening on eastern flank of NATO, where Eastern Europeans (such as Baltics, or Ukraine, which has already lost parts of its territory to Russia) feel threatened by Moscow, does not have security implications for countries situated on south-western edge of continent. Indeed, it seems that those who share this point of view and, like some politicians in Spain, question presence of Russian threat for them, have missed some recent important developments. First of all, new edition of Russian Federation's national security strategy, adopted on 31 December 2015, proclaims the United States and their allies main obstacle for promotion of Russian national interests and, therefore, de facto official enemies of Russian Federation.2 Further in text new strategy postulates that out of area actions by NATO are unacceptable from Russian standpoint, and represent a threat to Russia's national security3 which Russian government is determined to counter using any means, including military power.The messages contained in Russian strategy are crystal clear: any state that wishes to be secure vis-a-vis Russia needs to distance itself from U.S. and its security guarantees; those that do not are legitimate target for Russian coercion, intimidation and non-friendly actions. NATO's out of area actions, aimed at resolving non-military crises concerning southern Allies, must be stopped too, otherwise Russia reserves right to resort to use of its military power.4 However, there is no promise that secession from NATO security mechanism will really make any given state safe and relieve pressure from Moscow. Quite opposite is more feasible, as Kremlin has already shown on numerous occasions that it builds its policy on principle that it is always safer to hurt small and weak than strong and resolute. …