Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design
Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh
Abstract
Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh
Abstract
We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces.
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We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces.
Key concepts: Incentive compatibility, Mechanism design, Computer science, Bayesian probability, Mathematical optimization, Compatibility (geochemistry), Maximization, Incentive