An Empirical Study of Executive Compensation of State - owned Listed Companies on Corporate Financial Performance

Based on principal-agent theory, this paper studies the effect of executive compensation on state -owned listed companies' financial performance.The theory of principal-agent makes the information asymmetry between shareholders and management.The managers are responsible for the operation and management of the company and clearer about the future development prospects.The shareholders are difficult to grasp the company's real financial situation, and managers may be to maximize their own interests in a variety of ways to damage the interests of shareholders, so this paper set up a reasonable executive compensation incentive system, which is conducive to the reduction of the interests of shareholders and the company's future damage by studying the management of corporate financial performance impact.In this paper, 80 state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 2015 were selected as research samples, and the correlation analysis was used to confirm whether there was significant correlation between the executive compensation and financial performance of state-owned listed companies ,the linear regression analysis is constructed model Y which reflect the relationship of executive compensation and financial performance, which is used to verify the impact of executive compensation on corporate financial performance.