Nontransferable Individual Payoffs in Cooperative
Stochastic Dynamic Games
Abstract
Stochastic Dynamic Games
Abstract
In cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs, the players’ agreed-upon cooperative actions would determine the resulting payoff that each player receives. This article develops a mechanism for the derivation of individual player’s payoff functions in cooperative stochastic dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs. This is the first time that individual player’s payoff functions are characterized in an analytically derivable form in such a framework. An illustrative example is provided. Mathematics Subject Classifications: 91A12, 91A25
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In cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs, the players’ agreed-upon cooperative actions would determine the resulting payoff that each player receives. This article develops a mechanism for the derivation of individual player’s payoff functions in cooperative stochastic dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs. This is the first time that individual player’s payoff functions are characterized in an analytically derivable form in such a framework. An illustrative example is provided. Mathematics Subject Classifications: 91A12, 91A25
Key concepts: Stochastic game, Mathematical economics, Transferable utility, Subject (documents), Economics, Computer science, Mathematics, Game theory