The Slinky Effect" in Bosnia During the 1st Infantry's Tenure 1996-June 1997."
Joe L. Robinson
Abstract
Joe L. Robinson
Abstract
Abstract : Current doctrine and strategy is built around an endstate. The 1st Infantry Division found itself in a murky situation where the endstate was not defined. Therefore doctrine failed to present the military planner with the tools to put the Task Force Eagle mission into a neat dogmatic world. The 1st Infantry Division found a method to plan called the slinky effect. While this method is not prescriptive, it shows how one organization used a flexible/planning method to apply strategy in a non-traditional environment. The current planner's toolbox is inadequate to this task. This paper provides an alternate method with which one division planned.
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Abstract : Current doctrine and strategy is built around an endstate. The 1st Infantry Division found itself in a murky situation where the endstate was not defined. Therefore doctrine failed to present the military planner with the tools to put the Task Force Eagle mission into a neat dogmatic world. The 1st Infantry Division found a method to plan called the slinky effect. While this method is not prescriptive, it shows how one organization used a flexible/planning method to apply strategy in a non-traditional environment. The current planner's toolbox is inadequate to this task. This paper provides an alternate method with which one division planned.
Key concepts: Infantry, Engineering, Ancient history, Political science, History, Archaeology