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What the Army Needs to Know to Align Its Operational and Institutional Activities: Executive Summary

Frank Camm, Cynthia R. Cook, Ralph Masi, Anny Wong

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Abstract

As the U.S. Army transforms its combat force, inevitably the institutional Army -- the "generating force" that fills and sustains the Army's combat units -- must change as well. Stabilizing soldiers at posts and in units demands different personnel and training routines from those that supported the Army's long-standing "individual replacement" system. Developing and fielding an integrated "system of systems" and delivering it in sets to units entering the force-generation cycle also call for generating force activities markedly different from those mastered in years past. And a whole series of supporting organizations must adapt to the global deployments of an Army that will be based largely in the United States rather than overseas. Transformation of the institutional Army is surely as dramatic as the transformation of the Army's combat force. Yet, it is far less well understood. Over many years, the Army has developed an array of metrics to assess the performance of its combat units. Not surprisingly, the current Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and Army Posture Statement (APS) offer clear and fairly succinct visions for this part of the force: The Army seeks a more joint-oriented, expeditionary, modular, rebalanced, stabilized, and brigade-based operating force. When these documents turn to the institutional Army, by contrast, they say that the Army will use fewer resources to provide better support to the warfighter. A method is needed for aligning the operational and institutional portions of the Army for transformational purposes. This project, launched by then-Vice Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr., explains how to evaluate value chains to develop information that can promote such alignment. It formally evaluates value chains to develop illustrative high-level performance metrics relevant to the alignment of institutional medical, enlisted accessioning, and short-term acquisition services to the operating force.

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As the U.S. Army transforms its combat force, inevitably the institutional Army -- the "generating force" that fills and sustains the Army's combat units -- must change as well. Stabilizing soldiers at posts and in units demands different personnel and training routines from those that supported the Army's long-standing "individual replacement" system. Developing and fielding an integrated "system of systems" and delivering it in sets to units entering the force-generation cycle also call for generating force activities markedly different from those mastered in years past. And a whole series of supporting organizations must adapt to the global deployments of an Army that will be based largely in the United States rather than overseas. Transformation of the institutional Army is surely as dramatic as the transformation of the Army's combat force. Yet, it is far less well understood. Over many years, the Army has developed an array of metrics to assess the performance of its combat units. Not surprisingly, the current Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and Army Posture Statement (APS) offer clear and fairly succinct visions for this part of the force: The Army seeks a more joint-oriented, expeditionary, modular, rebalanced, stabilized, and brigade-based operating force. When these documents turn to the institutional Army, by contrast, they say that the Army will use fewer resources to provide better support to the warfighter. A method is needed for aligning the operational and institutional portions of the Army for transformational purposes. This project, launched by then-Vice Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr., explains how to evaluate value chains to develop information that can promote such alignment. It formally evaluates value chains to develop illustrative high-level performance metrics relevant to the alignment of institutional medical, enlisted accessioning, and short-term acquisition services to the operating force.

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Available abstract

As the U.S. Army transforms its combat force, inevitably the institutional Army -- the "generating force" that fills and sustains the Army's combat units -- must change as well. Stabilizing soldiers at posts and in units demands different personnel and training routines from those that supported the Army's long-standing "individual replacement" system. Developing and fielding an integrated "system of systems" and delivering it in sets to units entering the force-generation cycle also call for generating force activities markedly different from those mastered in years past. And a whole series of supporting organizations must adapt to the global deployments of an Army that will be based largely in the United States rather than overseas. Transformation of the institutional Army is surely as dramatic as the transformation of the Army's combat force. Yet, it is far less well understood. Over many years, the Army has developed an array of metrics to assess the performance of its combat units. Not surprisingly, the current Army Campaign Plan (ACP) and Army Posture Statement (APS) offer clear and fairly succinct visions for this part of the force: The Army seeks a more joint-oriented, expeditionary, modular, rebalanced, stabilized, and brigade-based operating force. When these documents turn to the institutional Army, by contrast, they say that the Army will use fewer resources to provide better support to the warfighter. A method is needed for aligning the operational and institutional portions of the Army for transformational purposes. This project, launched by then-Vice Chief of Staff General George W. Casey, Jr., explains how to evaluate value chains to develop information that can promote such alignment. It formally evaluates value chains to develop illustrative high-level performance metrics relevant to the alignment of institutional medical, enlisted accessioning, and short-term acquisition services to the operating force.

Key concepts: Engineering, Combat readiness, Transformational leadership, Operations research, Blueprint, Management, Political science, Operations management

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