MODERN HISTORY AND POLITICS: Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945

Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle Since 1945, by Peter Hahn. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005. xix+ 135 pages. Appendix to p. 181. Notes to p. 201. Bibl. to p. 212. Index to p. 221. $45. Americans have never been more anxious about US involvement in the Middle East. Today, Washington enjoys unrivaled power in the region, where the US military is heavily deployed, but diminished influence. Despite growing US involvement, many Americans remain astonishingly unfamiliar with the region. To help fill the void, Peter Hahn offers a balanced, accessible, and economical survey of American involvement in the Middle since World War II. Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle Since 1945 sets out to paint the contours of U.S. in the Middle East (p. xvii). It succeeds in its goal and provides an informative background for students of foreign policy, the newcomer to the region, and scholars in search of a quick reference. Hahn identifies four broad themes of US in the Middle since World War II. First, he discusses War and examines security structures erected to contain Soviet influence in the Middle East. second, the book points to the importance of the rise of nationalist movements across the Middle in shaping US in the region. Hahn argues that US leaders believed it was in America's interest to curtail these movements. Third, Hahn addresses US involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1950s. He highlights notable successes such as the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 brokered by President Jimmy Carter and the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994, while also examining the failures, like the 1993-2000 Oslo process. Lastly, the book paints a picture of rising US involvement in the Middle and stresses the centrality of the region in U.S. policy (p. xix). This broad survey uncovers larger patterns and themes that might not emerge in a more focused study. Most immediately, the reader is struck by the constraints that the War framework on US options. The stability-democracy tradeoff, at the heart of America's containment strategy, frequently, if unintentionally, exacerbated local conflicts. For example, Hahn notes that in the 1950s, Washington favored its Cold War interests over Arab-Israeli settlement when the two conflicted (p. 27). Similarly, in the wake of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan was reluctant to engage in peacemaking for fear he would put at risk a potential strategic partnership with Israel needed to contain Soviet influence in Syria and Iraq. Again, in 1985, the Reagan Administration did not embrace a proposed Jordanian-PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) peace plan and international conference because it offered the Soviets a seat at the table. …