2006•Corporate Ownership and ControlOpen access

The association between corporate governance and earnings management: The role of independent directors

Mark Benkel, Paul R. Mather, Alan Ramsay

Open full text 99 citations

Abstract

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes

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What this paper is about

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes

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Available abstract

The agency perspective of corporate governance emphasizes the monitoring role of the board of directors. This study is concerned with analyzing whether independent directors on the board and audit committee (recommendations of the ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003) are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results support the hypotheses that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board and on the audit committee are associated with reduced levels of earnings management. The results are robust to alternative specifications of the model. This study adds to the very limited research into the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Australia. It also provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of some of the regulators’ recommendations, which may be of value to regulators in preparing and amending corporate governance codes

Key concepts: Accounting, Audit committee, Corporate governance, Business, Earnings management, Audit, Principal–agent problem, Earnings

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