Setting the Agenda for Federal Agencies: Rulemaking Petitions at the FCC
David C. Nixon
Abstract
David C. Nixon
Abstract
A consideration of rulemaking petitions to the Federal Communication Commission takes advantage of a highly formalized process to help systematically examine the influence that regulated parties have on agenda formation. Since the 1960s, submissions of petitions for rulemaking to the FCC have generated an increasingly large share of the agency's entire rulemaking agenda, and success for petitions is clearly greater for powerful organized interests. But an analysis of the 237 petitions for rulemaking at the FCC demonstrates that powerful interests are limited in their ability to control the agency's agenda. For example, efforts to divert the agency's attention by submitting comments opposing petitions are, at best, inconsequential and may be counterproductive. In addition, the most powerful organized interests who submit petitions for rulemaking at the FCC experience less success when confronting a more liberal commission majority.
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A consideration of rulemaking petitions to the Federal Communication Commission takes advantage of a highly formalized process to help systematically examine the influence that regulated parties have on agenda formation. Since the 1960s, submissions of petitions for rulemaking to the FCC have generated an increasingly large share of the agency's entire rulemaking agenda, and success for petitions is clearly greater for powerful organized interests. But an analysis of the 237 petitions for rulemaking at the FCC demonstrates that powerful interests are limited in their ability to control the agency's agenda. For example, efforts to divert the agency's attention by submitting comments opposing petitions are, at best, inconsequential and may be counterproductive. In addition, the most powerful organized interests who submit petitions for rulemaking at the FCC experience less success when confronting a more liberal commission majority.
Key concepts: Rulemaking, Agency (philosophy), Commission, Regulatory agency, Political science, Public administration, Law and economics, Process (computing)