2016Unpublished venueRequires access

A Formal Analysis Method with Reasoning for Cryptographic Protocols

Jingchen Yan, Kazunori Wagatsuma, Hongbiao Gao, Jingde Cheng

Open publisher page 7 citations

Abstract

Formal analysis of protocols is to find out flaws in cryptographic protocols by formal method. In formal analysis methods with proving such as theorem proving and model checking, analysts must set possible attacks as targets, and then verify whether these attacks succeed or not. However, it's impossible to enumerate all attacks so that flaws may be not detected. As an alternative way, a formal analysis method with reasoning has been proposed, but it can only be applied to key exchange protocols. This paper presents a formal analysis method with reasoning for various cryptographic protocols. By succeeding in detecting flaws of splitting protocols, we show that the proposed method is effective for various cryptographic protocols.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Formal analysis of protocols is to find out flaws in cryptographic protocols by formal method. In formal analysis methods with proving such as theorem proving and model checking, analysts must set possible attacks as targets, and then verify whether these attacks succeed or not. However, it's impossible to enumerate all attacks so that flaws may be not detected. As an alternative way, a formal analysis method with reasoning has been proposed, but it can only be applied to key exchange protocols. This paper presents a formal analysis method with reasoning for various cryptographic protocols. By succeeding in detecting flaws of splitting protocols, we show that the proposed method is effective for various cryptographic protocols.

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OpenAlex reports 7 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Formal analysis of protocols is to find out flaws in cryptographic protocols by formal method. In formal analysis methods with proving such as theorem proving and model checking, analysts must set possible attacks as targets, and then verify whether these attacks succeed or not. However, it's impossible to enumerate all attacks so that flaws may be not detected. As an alternative way, a formal analysis method with reasoning has been proposed, but it can only be applied to key exchange protocols. This paper presents a formal analysis method with reasoning for various cryptographic protocols. By succeeding in detecting flaws of splitting protocols, we show that the proposed method is effective for various cryptographic protocols.

Key concepts: Cryptographic protocol, Computer science, Key exchange, Cryptographic primitive, Cryptography, Formal methods, Set (abstract data type), Key (lock)

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