Germany and the European Union
William E. Paterson
Abstract
William E. Paterson
Abstract
Germany’s European vocation was a constant in its European policy from the early days of the Federal Republic. This policy was associated with a ‘reflexive multilateralism’ (a fixed preference for supranational methods) and a reluctance to base policy explicitly on national interest discourse. In exercising its European vocation of ‘more Europe’ as the default position, the Federal Republic operated through the Franco-German relationship. This policy had brought Germany great prosperity and was a key facilitator of German unity. In recent years the 2004 eastern enlargement of the EU and France’s weakening economic position has eroded the traction of the Franco-German relationship. Generational change has greatly modified the instinctive affinity of the political elite with the EU. The key game changer however has been the onset of the crisis in the eurozone, a crisis which has propelled Germany as the principal creditor into the leadership position in the eurozone and placed great strains on the EU founding myth that in some sense all the member states are equal.
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Germany’s European vocation was a constant in its European policy from the early days of the Federal Republic. This policy was associated with a ‘reflexive multilateralism’ (a fixed preference for supranational methods) and a reluctance to base policy explicitly on national interest discourse. In exercising its European vocation of ‘more Europe’ as the default position, the Federal Republic operated through the Franco-German relationship. This policy had brought Germany great prosperity and was a key facilitator of German unity. In recent years the 2004 eastern enlargement of the EU and France’s weakening economic position has eroded the traction of the Franco-German relationship. Generational change has greatly modified the instinctive affinity of the political elite with the EU. The key game changer however has been the onset of the crisis in the eurozone, a crisis which has propelled Germany as the principal creditor into the leadership position in the eurozone and placed great strains on the EU founding myth that in some sense all the member states are equal.
Key concepts: European union, Political science, Position (finance), German, European integration, Prosperity, European debt crisis, Multilateralism