Judicial decision-making and ‘outside’ extra-legal knowledge: breaking down silos
Kylie Burns, Rachel Dioso‐Villa, Zoe Rathus
Abstract
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Kylie Burns, Rachel Dioso‐Villa, Zoe Rathus
Abstract
Open-access reader
Judges apply law to facts. While this ‘umpire’ description of judicial decision-making is rhetorically (and often politically and publicly) attractive, it is of course a very incomplete account of ...
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Judges apply law to facts. While this ‘umpire’ description of judicial decision-making is rhetorically (and often politically and publicly) attractive, it is of course a very incomplete account of ...
Key concepts: Judicial opinion, Discretion, Law, Judicial discretion, Legal profession, Jurisprudence, Political science, Sociology